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COMPENSATION FOR CIvILIANS HARMED IN THE

PURSUIT OF FOREIGN PoLIcY GOALS:
RECENT LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS
MARK GIBNEY*

Under widely accepted principles of international law, nations are not to
harm civilians in other countries. Despite these proscriptions,' however,
civilians continue to suffer harm and destruction at escalating levels.
Consider the fact that in the past decade the number of refugees in the world
has increased threefold. There are at present upwards of 15 million people
seeking to escape the violence in their home land.2 These are the lucky
ones. While civilian death tolls constituted one-half of the war dead in the
1950s, by the late 1980s this number had increased to nearly three-fourths
of the total.3 Much of this human carnage has occurred in the Third World,
but it would be a grave error to view this as only a Third World phenomenon. Instead, many of the conflicts that recently have produced massive
numbers of civilian deaths-Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua and El
Salvador, to name a few-were, in many respects, proxy battles between the
superpowers.
It is unclear what recourse, if any, civilians (or their heirs) have. The
image of Brecht's Mother Courage is a telling one, not only in terms of the
level of personal suffering and destruction of property that she must endure,
but also in the sense that there is no apparent means of compensation or
restitution, nevermind the means of preventing such atrocities from occurring
in the first place. In sum, although nations are obligated not to harm
civilians in other countries while pursuing their own foreign policy objectives, they certainly have done so in the past and there is every indication
that they will continue to do so in the future. Yet, these same nations have
been able to simply walk away from the suffering and destruction they have
helped bring about. This, sadly enough, is the international system as it
exists today. 4
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1. For an excellent discussion of the law in this area see Weissbrodt & Andrs, The
Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Peoples' International v. United States, 29
HARV. INT'L L.J. 59 (1988).
2.
A. ZOLBERG, A. SUHRKE & S. AGUAYO, ESCAPE FROM VIOLENCE: CONFLICT AND
THE REFUGEE CRISIS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD (1989).
3.
R. SIVARD, WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1989 (1989).

4. There has been an interesting Supreme Court jurisprudence in this general area that
can only be briefly examined. In Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115 (1852) a merchant who
traveled with the U.S. Army and who had some of his merchandise appropriated during
hostilities sued to recover the cost of his lost goods. The Supreme Court ordered recovery
holding:
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It is this idea that civilians have no recourse for their harm and suffering
that has been challenged recently in several cases brought in U.S. federal
court. In this litigation, individuals living in countries experiencing civil
strife supported directly or indirectly by the United States have brought suit
against officials of the U.S. government for the latter's role in bringing about
death and destruction. This litigation is scant and uneven, but its importance
lies in the fact that it poses a very fundamental question that has up to now
been ignored: to what extent should a nation be held responsible for the
human consequences of its pursuit of foreign policy objectives?
I.

EMINENTE V. JOHNSON'

Eminente was a suit brought in a United States federal district court by a
non-resident alien against officers of the U.S. government seeking monetary
damages and/or injunctive relief for the destruction of the plaintiff's property

There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may lawfully be
taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from falling into the hands of the
public enemy; and also where a military officer, charged with particular duty, may
impress private property into the public service or take it for public use.
Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is bound to make full compensation
to the owner ....
Id. at 133. Accord, United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871) (compensation ordered for the
use of plaintiff's steamboats).
The rule of law began to change when the class of cases changed. For example, in United
States v. Pacific Railroad, 120 U.S. 227 (1887), the Court maintained that the government was
under no legal duty to compensate those who lost property during the Civil War. The Court
provided the following rationale:
The war, whether considered with reference to the number of troops in the field,
the extent of military operations, and the number and character of the engagements, attained proportions unequaled in the history of the present century. More
than a million of men [sic] were in the armies on each side. The injury and
destruction of private property caused by their operations, and by measures
necessary for their safety and efficiency, were almost beyond calculation. For all
injuries and destruction which followed necessarily from these causes no
compensation could be claimed from the government.
120 U.S. at 233-34. A more modem examination of this principle occurred in United States v.
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952). In this case, the U.S. Army officials had
destroyed the plaintiffs' oil terminal facilities in the Philippines so they would not fall into the
hands of the advancing Japanese Army. Although the Court of Claims had found for the
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court reversed.
The terse language of the Fifth Amendment is no comprehensive promise that the
United States will make whole all who suffer from every ravage and burden of
war. This Court has long recognized that in wartime many losses must be
attributed solely to the fortunes of war, and not to the sovereign. No rigid rules
can be laid down to distinguish compensable losses from noncompensable losses.
Each case must be judged by its own facts. But the general principles laid down
in the Pacific Railroad case seem especially applicable here.
344 U.S. at 155-56.
5.
361 F. 2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 929 (1966).
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in Vietnam. The cursory treatment of this claim is instructive. The district
court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, and this holding was upheld
on appeal. The opinion of the appellate court is set forth below in its
entirety.
The Appeal is from dismissal of an action for damages and related
injunctive relief, filed in the District Court by a non-resident alien
against the United States without its consent with respect to a nonjusticiable issue, namely, damage to property in a foreign country
said to have been caused by the armed forces of the United States
acting under authority of the Government of the United States. 6
The brevity of the court's opinion strongly suggests the perceived
impropriety of such litigation. In one sense this is correct, but it is also
noteworthy that at the time that Eminente was handed down, the U.S.
government had established a claims program in Vietnam, albeit one of very
modest means. Major General George Prugh describes the underlying
rationale for such a program.
The arrival in South Vietnam of massive amounts of material and
large numbers of troops in the mid-1960s clearly established the
need for an effective claims program to cope with incidents that
would involve claims for compensation against the United States.
It was also apparent that a well-organized and well-administered
indemnification program would be an invaluable asset to the
Republic of Vietnam and its allies. Not only would such a
program deny the insurgents a propaganda weapon, but it would
create a climate favorable to respect for law and order.'
Prugh notes that while the Foreign Claims Act8 excludes payment of any
claim that is combat related, still, in many cases compensation was made in
situations that were combat indirectly related. 9 Before concluding that the
United States made complete restitution and indemnification for the death and
destruction it helped bring about in Vietnam, however, consider the fact that
death claims were limited to the payment of between $50 and $300.10
Despite the Vietnam claims program described above, Eminente represents
the status quo. The well-worn cliche is that war is hell, and a very large part
of this hell is death and destruction. Yet, the idea of a civilian suing to
recover damages on this very basis was anathema to our judiciary at that

6.
7.

Id. at 73 (Burger J., concurring).
G. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR 1964-1973, 79 (1975).

8.

10 U.S.C. § 2734 (1956).

9.
10.

Prugh, supra note 7, at 83.
Id. at 85.
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time, and perhaps at the present time as well. The only real surprise raised
by Eminente, then, is that a non-resident alien would even consider bringing
such a suit in the first place.
If Eminente's claim seems counterintuitive and out of place in our judicial
system, a view certainly held by the court of appeals, it is essentially because
we are not accustomed to such challenges to the conduct of foreign affairs.
Consider, however, some analogous situations. For one, if Eminente's
property was located in the United States and owned by an American citizen,
there is little question that the U.S. government would have been ordered to
make compensation for its destruction. Why the opposite result? As will be
shown, the judiciary's concern is in not interfering (or, more importantly,
giving the appearance of interfering) with the pursuit of this nation's foreign
policy. But would a suit for the destruction of Eminente's property in
Vietnam necessarily interfere with the American conduct of the war any
more than if the property was in the United States?
Another question that needs to be raised is if Eminente had brought suit
after the war (we will set aside statute of limitation considerations). That is,
Eminente arrives in the United States in 1976 and files the same lawsuit.
The claim itself-the destruction of property-is a fairly common one in our
judicial system. Moreover, there is no more war between the United States
and Vietnam, so the judiciary's abstention cannot be based on the grounds
of interfering with its conduct. Why, then, would Eminente's suit be
dismissed in 1976 as it was a decade earlier, and as it most assuredly would
be today as well?
II. RAMJREZ DE ARELLNo v. WEINBERGERn
Ramirez de Arellano was a suit brought in a federal district court in July
1983 by an American citizen12 living in Honduras who claimed that officials
of the United States government had effectively seized and destroyed his
meat and shrimp packing plant in that Central American country. According
to the complaint, in April 1983 the U.S. Defense Department began erecting
a Military Training Center on the plaintiffs' property in order to train
soldiers from the Salvadoran Army. This training center-replete with a
1000 man tent camp, ammunition and storage facilities, as well as a firing
range-took up nearly 90 percent of the arable land on de Arellano's 14,000
acre ranch. As a result of the construction and ensuing military operations,
the plaintiffs alleged numerous injuries.
Prime grazing land and fences have been bulldozed. The flow of
water to the plaintiffs' meat-packing plant has been interrupted by
11. 745 F. 2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en bane), vacated on othergrounds, 471 U.S. 1113
(1985).
12. Ramirez de Arellano also sued on behalf of six corporations, all wholly owned and
controlled by him.
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol22/iss1/3

4

Gibney: Compensation for Civilians Harmed in the Pursuit of Foreign Polic
1991] COMPENSATION FOR CIVILIANs HARMED IN PuRsurr OF FOREON POLICY GoALs

63

the soldiers' diversion of substantial quantities of water for their
own use. Cattle have been shot by stray bullets. "Large numbers
of armed soldiers and trainees roaming around [the] ranch and the
area of [the] meat-packing plant" have frightened Ramirez's
family and his employees. Ranch employees, fearing for their
lives, have refused to tend cattle near the military operations,
causing the livestock to become undernourished. . . . The
operations are destroying the plaintiffs' investment and Ramirez's
life's work.3
The suit alleged that the defendants' occupation and destruction of the
plaintiffs' property was unconstitutional because it was not authorized by any
federal statute or provision of the Constitution. The complaint sought
declaratory and injunctive relief and any other relief deemed just and proper
by the court.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the action presented
a nonjusticiable political question. Although the defendants did not file a
formal answer to the plaintiffs' complaint, in their motion to dismiss they
disputed the plaintiffs' factual claims, contending that the training center on
de Arellano's property was a project of the Honduran government. Although
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiffs' allegations are
assumed to be true for purposes of a motion to dismiss,14 the district court
granted the defendants' motion, which the plaintiffs then appealed.
Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
overturned the district court order. 5 The essence of this decision was that
suit was not barred by the political question doctrine. Instead, the court held
that "[tihe plaintiffs do not seek judicial monitoring of foreign policy in
Central America nor do they challenge United States relations with any
foreign country. The case does not raise the specter of judicial control and
management of United States foreign policy."
In the court's view, the
case was merely one involving "[p]rivate United States litigants seek[ing] a
determination of the Executive's deprivation of their private property.""
Ramirez de Arellano raises as many issues as it answers. One question is
whether the court would have decided the same way if the plaintiffs had
alleged personal injury rather than the destruction of property. At one point
in his majority opinion Judge Wilkey wrote: "This is a paradigmatic issue
for resolution by the Judiciary. The federal courts historically have resolved
disputes over land, even when the United States military is occupying the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

745 F.2d at 1507-08.
FED. R. Civ. P. § 12(b)(6).
745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, Bork, Starr and Tamm, JJ., dissenting).
745 F.2d at 1513.
Id. at 1514.
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property at issue.""8 A related question involves the value of the property
in question. In its holding, the court frequently referred to the fact that
Ramirez de Arellano had a $13 million dollar investment in Honduras, and
that the corporations involved in the litigation were multinational enterprises.
Would the court have reached the same result if the plaintiff had simply lost
his humble abode? Another unanswered question is whether the court would
have upheld a motion to dismiss if the plaintiffs' property had been located
in another country, El Salvador for example, where the conduct of U.S.
military affairs would have been even more apparent.
The most basic issue that Ramirez leaves unresolved, however, is whether
the court would have decided the same way if the individual plaintiff had not
been a United States citizen. A theme that runs throughout the court's
lengthy opinion indicates that it would have mattered a great deal.
The Executive's power to conduct foreign relations free from the
unwarranted supervision of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to trample the most fundamental liberty and
property rights of this country's citizenry.19
The suggestion [by the defendants] that a United States citizen
who is the sole beneficial owner of viable business operations does
not have constitutional rights against United States government
officials' threatened complete destruction of corporate assets is
preposterous. If adopted by this court, the proposition would
obliterate the constitutional property rights of many United States
citizens abroad and would make a mockery of decades of United
States policy on transnational investments.'
Because we hold that the United States plaintiffs have a protected
property interest for the purposes of the claims asserted here and
that they have standing to sue, we do not reach the question
whether the alien Honduran corporations also have constitutional
rights to judicial relief for the violations alleged here.
We analyze this issue, as we must, on the basis of the facts
alleged by the plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs' complaint,
the operation is the enterprise of one man-a United States
citizen. 2'
Despite the novel and important issues raised in Ramirez de Arellano, the
case has received a scant amount of academic attention. What principle does

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1512.
1515.
1515-16.
1516-17.
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the case stand for? A narrow reading would limit the case to its unique set
of facts: an American citizen who owns corporate property in another
country which allegedly has been seized and destroyed by the United States
government is not barred from bringing suit in a U.S. court on the basis of
the political question doctrine. It is possible, of course, to read Ramirez de
Arellano much broader than that. For example, it could be maintained that
the worth of the property in question was irrelevant to the disposition of the
case. Thus, the destruction of de Arellano's home or even his tractor would
have generated as much concern by the judiciary as the loss of his business
establishment apparently did.
It also might be possible to read Ramirez de Arellano broadly enough so
that it does not matter what the citizenship of the plaintiff happened to be.
Under this reading, Ramirez de Arellano should have be able to have his day
in a United States court even if he was a Honduran citizen. The destruction
of property is the destruction of property, no matter what the citizenship of
the owner happens to be. The problem, however, is that this kind of
situation begins to sound like Eminente: a suit brought by a non-resident
alien for the destruction of property by the United States government. It
should be noted that Ramirez de Arellano was decided by the same court that
had previously decided Eminente, although no mention of the earlier case
was ever made. As a final point, although the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Ramirez, the case was remanded and vacated on other grounds
in light of the restrictions placed on the construction of a military training
center in Honduras by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.'
III. SANCHEZ-ESPINO7A V. REAGAN2

A year after Ramirez de Arellano was decided by the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia sitting en banc, a unanimous three judge panel of
that same circuit denied a similar claim for relief in a suit brought by a group
of Nicaraguan civilians against federal officials for the latter's support of the
Contra rebel forces.' Suit for damages and/or injunctive relief was brought
under the Alien Tort Statute which reads: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."'

22.

Pub. L. No. 98473, 98 Stat. 1884, 1893-94.

23.

770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

24.

There were two other groups of plaintiffs in this case. One group was comprised of

12 Congressmen who were suing on the grounds that the Executive branch was usurping
Congress' role to declare war, and also violating the Boland Amendment which was law at the
time that suit was filed. The other group of plaintiffs were two citizens of Dade County, Florida
who claimed that the training of Contra rebel forces in that area was a common nuisance. Both
of these claims were dismissed, but will not be addressed here. For a more extended discussion
of this case see Gibney, Human Rights and Human Consequences: A CriticalExamination of
Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 10 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 299 (1988).
25.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991).
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The principal assertion made by the plaintiffs was that the named federal
officials had "'[a]uthorized, financed, trained, directed and knowingly
provided substantial assistance for the performance of activities which
terrorize and otherwise injure the civilian population of the Republic of
Nicaragua.'" '
Among the terror allegedly carried out by the contras was
the following: "'[s]ummary execution, murder, abduction, torture, rape,
wounding and the destruction of private property and public facilities.'"'
The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss on the ground
that resolution of the claims presented would require the court to address a
nonjusticiable political question. In reaching its decision, the district court
had relied primarily upon the D.C. circuit's opinion in Eminente, discussed
earlier. In an opinion by then-Judge Scalia the court of appeals affirmed the
decision, but the court rejected the use of the political question doctrine.
The court relied instead on the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity.
In terms of the plaintiffs' claims for monetary damages, the court held: "[it
would make a mockery of the doctrine of sovereign immunity if federal
courts were authorized to sanction or enjoin, by judgments nominally against
present or former Executive officials, actions that are, concededly and as a
jurisdictionalnecessity, official actions of the United States. "2
The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief in a similar
vein.
The support for military operations that we are asked to terminate
has, if the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true,
received the attention and approval of the President, the Secretary
of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the CIA,
and involves the conduct of our diplomatic relations with at least
four foreign states-Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and
Argentina. Whether or not this is, as the District Court thought,
a matter so entirely committed to the care of the political branches
as to preclude our considering the issue at all, we think it at least
requires the withholding of discretionary relief.'
There are several aspects of the court's use of the sovereign immunity
doctrine that warrant discussion. The first is the jurisdictional distinction that
the court makes between domestic sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign
immunity.
Since the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is quite distinct
from the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity that we apply

26.
27.
28.
29.

770 F.2d at 205.
Id.
770 F.2d at 207 (emphasis in original).
Id. at208.
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here, being based upon considerations of international comity,
rather than separation of powers, it does not necessarily follow

that an Alien Tort Statute suit filed against the officer of a foreign
sovereign would have to be dismissed. Thus, nothing in today's
decision necessarily conflicts with the decision of the Second
Circuit in Filartigav. Pena-Irala.°
The odd result that this dichotomy brings is this. Filartigawas an Alien
Tort Statute31 suit brought in a U.S. federal court by Paraguayan citizens
against Pena-Irala, formerly the Inspector General of Police in Asuncion,
Paraguay, for events arising from the torture and death of the plaintiffs' son,
all of which occurred in Paraguay. Under the court's holding in SanchezEspinoza in language quoted above,' there is nothing inconsistent in a
United States court hearing one case-Filartiga-butnot the other one--Sanchez-Espinoza-althoughthe latter alleges human rights abuses brought on
in part by the United States government, while the former has no connection
with the U.S. government, its citizens or its corporations. Beyond this
perplexing jurisdictional result, Judge Scalia's notion of the basis for
sovereign immunity also raises some serious questions.

According to the

court, the actions by officers of the U.S. government that are said to be
violations of international law and the United States Constitution are

protected by the doctrine of domestic sovereign immunity simply because
these same actions have received the attention and approval of these same
federal officials. In short, in the realm of foreign affairs, the king can do no
wrong, and if he does so he is still protected as long as he has given his
attention and approval to such illegal actions.
The court's view of the impetus behind the litigation is also interesting to
note. Toward the end of his opinion Judge Scalia questions the bonafides
of the plaintiffs' claims.
Whether or not the present litigation is motivated by considerations of geopolitics rather than personal harm, we think that as
a general matter the danger of foreign citizens' [sic] using the
courts in situations such as this to obstruct the foreign policy of

our government is sufficiently acute that we must leave to
Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist.33
By questioning the motivations behind this particular litigation, Scalia is
conveniently able to ignore the very real human consequences of this U.S.
backed civil war, the most vivid being the fact that upwards of 30,000

30.
31.

Id. at 207 n.5 (citations omitted).
Supra note 25.

32.
33.

Supra note 28.
770 F.2d at 209.
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civilians died during hostilities. Scalia, however, is also misguided about
those filing suit. The testimony provided below is a sample of the atrocities
allegedly experienced by the plaintiffs or members of their family.
In July 1982, 130 Contras, members of the FDN, attacked San
Francisco de Guajinaqulapa, with rifles, mortars and machine
guns, ransacking houses and overrunning the town. After the
attackers left, plaintiff Elia Maria Espinoza found her husband, his
head smashed, and brains falling out.... Plaintiff Jose SantosBarrera found his son lying face up, his chest bullet-ridden and his
legs destroyed. Plaintiff Maria Espinal Mondragon found the
body of her husband, with holes in his neck, stomach and right
leg. His throat, as well as the throats of other victims lying near
him, had been slit. The attackers kidnapped eight persons,
including plaintiff Javier Sanchez-Espinoza.'
The court not only assumes that the lawsuit was politically motivated-is
it really so political to want to end this kind of suffering?-but it also
assumes that a decision by a U.S. court would necessarily "obstruct the
foreign policy of our government. . .. "I Note that federal officials made
the same kind of claim in Ramirez de Arellano, but the court rejected the
argument in that case, concluding that it was not being asked to monitor
American policy in Central America. Ironically enough, there is no mention
of Ramirez de Arellano in Sanchez-Espinoza, although the claims presented
are in fact quite similar, and Ramirez de Arellano was decided in the same
judicial circuit only a year earlier by an en banc panel.
A final point to address is the court's position that "we must leave to
Congress the judgment whether a damage remedy should exist."'
Undoubtedly this would be the optimal solution, but what if no damage remedy
is forthcoming? Should the judicial branch order compensation only when
the political branches have so directed, but not otherwise? What does this
say about our system of checks and balances and the notion of separation of
powers? What does this also say about the judiciary's role for those harmed
by government conduct?
IV.

COMMITTEE OF U.S. CITIZENS IN NICARAGUA

V. REAGAN

37

The final case that will be examined is Committee of U.S. Citizens in
Nicaraguav. Reagan, decided by a unanimous three judge panel of the D.C.
Circuit Court. The plaintiffs were individual U.S. citizens and organizations

34.

Brief for the Appellants at 8, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir 1985) (No. 83-1997).

35.

'Id.

36.
37.

Id.
859 F.2d 929 (D.C. App. 1988).
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representing the same who lived and worked in Nicaragua. In the complaint
filed in federal district court, the plaintiffs alleged that the United States'
support for the Contras was in violation of both international law and the
U.S. Constitution. In terms of the former, the plaintiffs attempted to rely on
the judgment of the International Court of Justice in Nicaragua v. United
States 8 which decided that the U.S. had violated international law and thus
"'[ius under a duty to immediately cease and to refrain from all acts as may
constitute breaches of the foregoing obligations.'"" Included among those
acts were the "'ttraining, arming, equipping, financing and supplying [of]
the contra forces.'" '
The plaintiffs' constitutional claim was related to the one made under
international law. The plaintiffs alleged that the U.S. government supported
and trained the Contras who, in turn, "'[detained, threatened and deprived'"
plaintiffs of their liberty."' (It should be noted that by the time the case
came up on appeal, one of the original plaintiffs to the suit had been killed,
allegedly by members of the Contras.) Part of the claim of physical harm
and the threat of harm rested on a generalized fear of the recurring violence
in Nicaragua. But the plaintiffs also alleged that Americans were among the
Contras' specific targets. According to the complaint, the Contra leaders had
declared that "'[aill ...foreigners, known as internationalists, would be
considered enemy targets'" and have "described the internationalists as 'part
of the enemy.'"42
The suit was dismissed by the district court on the basis of the political
question doctrine. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal,
but on other grounds. In fact, the court took special measures to address this
issue. "We believe the trial court's reliance on the political question doctrine
was misplaced, particularly to the extent that appellants seek to vindicate
personal rights rather than to conform America's foreign policy to international norms."' Later, the court cited Ramirez de Arellano and quoted
language from that opinion.
As our court declared in rejecting a political question defense to
a fifth amendment takings claim, "[t]he Executive's power to
conduct foreign relations free from the unwarranted supervision
of the Judiciary cannot give the Executive carte blanche to
trample the most fundamental liberty and property rights of this
country's citizenry.""

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

1986 I.C.J. 14.
859 F.2d at 932.
Id.
Id. at 933.
Id.
Id. at 932.
Id. at 935 (citing Ramirez de Arello, 745 F.2d at 1515).
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Despite the court's recognition that the plaintiffs, U.S. citizens, were
presenting serious allegations seeking to vindicate their personal rights, the
court nevertheless held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. In terms of the plaintiffs' claim under international
law, the court attempted to address the question of the role, if any, that
international law can play in domestic proceedings. "[D]o violations of
international law have domestic legal consequences? The answer largely
depends on what form the 'violation' takes."' The court then expressed
the view that if the President and the Congress, acting in concert, had
violated an international legal norm, a domestic court has no authority to
remedy such a violation if the law or norm was either a treaty or a rule of
customary international law. If, however, the political branches have
violated a peremptory norm of international law--or jus cogens-"[the
domestic legal consequences are unclear."' The court explained:
Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against
murder and slavery may well have the domestic legal effect that
appellants suggest. That is, they may well restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains it. If
Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement
of our citizens or of other individuals, that policy might well be
subject to challenge in domestic court under international law.47
The court then went on to say that failure to follow a ruling by the ICJ did
not constitute a violation of a peremptory norm of international law."
What is interesting to note is that the plaintiffs were not only claiming that
the failure to carry out the ruling by the ICJ constituted a violation of
international law, but they were also claiming that the judgment itself was
evidence-and very strong evidence in fact-that the United States had
committed jus cogens violations: the aggressive and illegal use of force
against another nation. The court, however, chose to ignore the very basis
of the holding by the International Court, looking instead only at the failure
to enact the decision. In the court's language: "[t]his argument
confuses the judgment itself with the ICJ's rationale for that judgment. 49
By narrowly focusing on the fact that the U.S. had ignored the ICJ
judgment (while finding nojus cogens violations from this alone), but at the
same time viewing the factual allegations behind the judgment as immaterial
to the case before it, the court was thereby able to insulate itself from the
more serious charges of conduct by the United States government. The court

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id.at941.
Id.at 942.
Id.
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did say that a jus cogens violation might be subject to domestic legal
challenge. However, the extreme example used by the court-slavery of a
foreign population or of the American citizenry-simply serves to underscore
the degree of judicial deference.
The plaintiffs' fifth amendment constitutional claim was based on the
ground that the United States government was providing assistance to the
Contras who were in turn denying the plaintiffs their life, liberty and
property without due process of law. Although the court seemed concerned
by this claim, it ultimately held that the link between the United States and
the Contras was not strong enough to impute the actions of the latter to the
former.
Appellants must demonstrate.., that the United States' involvement in this targeting of Americans in Nicaraguais sufficient to
constitute a due process violation by our government. Appellants'
fifth amendment claim founders on this requirement; their
complaint does not allege that the United States has participated
in any way in the targeting or injuries against Americans or their
property in Nicaragua. Nor do they allege that such injuries are
intended consequences of our government's support for the
Contras.'

The court then attempted to explain why the actions of the Contras could not
be attributed to the United States. "The only alleged fact that links our
government to the actions that have harmed appellants is Congress'
appropriation of money to the Contras for their continued 'resistance' against
the Nicaraguan government."'"
What the court chose to ignore is that the ICJ had found much more than
a financial link between the U.S. government and the Contras. In fact,
earlier in its opinion the court had quoted language from the findings from
the ICJ ruling which held that the United States had violated international law
by "training, arming, equipping, financing and supplying"52 the Contra
rebel forces. Why the court simply chose to focus on the financial
connection is unclear. Moreover, even if the only connection between the
United States and the Contras had been a financial one, the court also
ignored the fact that without these substantial levels of support-both covert
and overt, legal and illegal-the Contras would have ceased as a fighting
force. Thus, it would not have been stretching legal reasoning, or common
sense, to see the actions of the Contras and the United States government as
being very closely related.
In addition to the question whether the tie between the U.S. government

50.
51.
52.

Id. at 945 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 946.
Id. at 932.
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and the contras was strong enough to attribute the actions of the latter to the
former, the plaintiffs also alleged a constitutional violation on the part of
federal officials themselves in their decision to fund the contras. Under this
view, assistance to an organization that has committed widespread human
rights abuses, and which has targeted U.S. citizens as the enemy, "directly,
forseeably, and necessarily increases the risk to the lives and security of U.S.
citizens."' As a result, the plaintiffs contended that federal officials had
violated their constitutional rights in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives.
In responding to this claim, the court went through a tortuous analysis of
cases involving government responsibility for the actions of parolees and
prison inmates. Although many would find the comparison an apt one, the
court ultimately concluded that "[a]ppellants do not allege that the United
States exercises the type of control over the Contra forces that prison
officials exercise over inmates."' The court held that "[t]here must be a
much stronger allegation of deliberate targeting of Americans by the Contras,
and of congressional awareness of that targeting, before the possibility of due
process violation would arise. .

. ."'

Ironically enough, then, what

insulates the United States government from liability under this analysis is the
fact that it did not have adequate control over an organization that it was
funding, but which had also committed gross levels of human rights abuses.
V.

DISCUSSION

It is not clear what legal principles emerge from this caselaw. The widely
accepted rule seems to be embodied in Eminente: a nation is under no duty
to provide compensation to civilians who are harmed during the course of the
pursuit of foreign policy objectives. Despite the general acceptance of this
principle, we have also seen some cracks in its edifice. Ramirez de Arellano
is arguably an exceptional case because it directly challenges this proposition.
In this case, a U.S. court held that one who has property destroyed or
confiscated by the United States military may bring suit seeking compensation for these actions. What is uncertain is whether Ramirez de Arellano is
an aberration. Sanchez-Espinoza, decided only a year later and in the same
circuit, seems to indicate that it might be. However, the court in Committee
of U.S. Citizens came very close to finding liability on the part of the United
States government for the actions of the U.S.-sponsored Contras.
One principle that these cases do seem to stand for is that it matters a great
deal who is bringing suit. An American citizen caught in the crossfire of
war or civil strife in another country where the United States government is
pursuing foreign policy ends is much more likely to obtain redress in a U.S.

53.
54.
55.

859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1989), citing Brief for the Appellants, at 16.
859 F.2d at 950.
Id. at 952.
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court than a foreign citizen is.' The rationale that seems to be employed
is that U.S. citizens enjoy constitutional protection no matter where they
happen to be living.' While there is a certain intuitive ring to this concept,
it easily leads to some inconsistent results." For example, if U.S. military
personnel confiscated ten meatpacking plants-nine owned by Honduran
citizens and one owned by an American citizen living in Honduras-it would
seem odd that only the latter would be able to bring suit in an American
court for acts growing out of the same policy of confiscation.
Ramirez de Arellano is not the only indication that under certain circumstances the United States government will attempt to make compensation to
civilians in other countries. The extraordinarily modest Vietnamese program
was described earlier. In addition, the United States government recently has
offered ex gratiapayment for harm caused by military personnel. The first
involved payments to citizens of Grenada for damage done in the U.S.
invasion in 1983. 9 The second instance where compensation was offered
was when the battleship Vincennes shot down an Iranian commercial
airliner.' Finally, the United States government provided $420 million in
economic assistance to Panama after the U.S. military invasion of that
country."
In so-called "friendly" wars, then-Vietnam, Grenada and Panama-the
United States seems willing to offer some kind of compensation, sometimes

56. This point was underscored by the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
In this case, the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to searches on foreign soil conducted by U.S. drug agents. The
Court did indicate, however, that it would have reached a contrary result if the premises
searched had been owned by a United States citizen.
57. It is not only domestic courts that are far more willing to respond when an American
citizen is involved. The same is true (perhaps more true) of the political branches as well. A
recent editorial underscores this point. The editorial begins:
Tens of thousands of Guatemalan civilians have died violently in recent decades,
with few of their killers brought to account. Now the suspicious death of an
American could spur overdue Government action. The Bush Administration
deserves credit for pressing the case.
Death and Democracy in Guatemala, The N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1990, at A20, col. 1. While
the Bush Administration might well deserve credit for pressing the case of an American civilian,
who is to take the blame for decades of inaction when only Guatemalan civlians were killed?
58. For an excellent treatment of the enormous disparities between domestic and
international standards see L. BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989).

59. Weissbrodt & Andrus, The Right to Life During Armed Conflict: Disabled Peoples'
International v. United States, 29 HARv. INT'L L.J. 59, 64-65 (1988).
60. See generally Maier, Ex Gratia Payments and the IranianAirline Tragedy, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 325(1989). In the Vincennes incident, the United States government offered to pay
between $100,000 and $250,000 to the families of Iranian civilians and airline personnel who
were killed when the battleship mistakenly shot down a commercial airliner. However, the
Iranian government has refused this offer and it has brought a suit against the U.S. in the
International Court of Justice.
61. Felton, Panama-McaraguaLegislation Helps Other Nations, Too, CONG. Q., June 2,

1990, at 1736.
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directly to the individuals who have been harmed,' in other instances in the
form of a general aid package. Compensation was also attempted in the
Vincennes incident, certainly no friendly conflict, but one might be able to
explain this particular result on the basis of the amount of negative publicity
that the downing of the airliner created. If U.S. military personnel had
simply dropped a bomb on an Iranian airport killing 242 people it is quite

unlikely that any compensation would ever have been contemplated, although
it is difficult to explain the conceptual difference. Moreover, without the

Executive's offer of restitution, it is just as unlikely that a suit filed in a U.S.
court by the heirs of these Iranian citizens would be successful.

In conclusion, there is some indication that the rules of the international
system might be changing and that, at times, a nation will be held accountable for the harm and destruction that it has caused civilians in other
countries. The recent conflict in the Persian Gulf should be a true test to see

if this principle of international law is accepted in practice as well as in
theory.

62. There is some noteworthy litigation in this area as well. During the Grenada invasion,
U.S. military personnel bombed a mental institution killing sixteen patients and injuring six. In
November, 1983, the Disabled Peoples' International filed a complaint against the United States
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on behalf of the "unnamed, unnumbered
residents, both living and dead, of the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum, Grenada, West Indies."
The complaint alleged an "unjustified violation of the right to life, liberty and security of the
person pursuant to article I of the American Declaration of Rights and Duties of Man." In
April 1986, the Commission found the complaint admissible, with the Commission finding a
prima facie violation of the American Declaration by the United States. For an extended
treatment of this litigation see Weissbrodt & Andrus, supra note 1.
Turning to the human consequences of another invasion, administrative law claims have been
filed on behalf of 160 Panamanian civilians who were killed or injured during the U.S. military
action in that country in December, 1989. The basis of these claims is that although the Foreign
Claims Act exempts the payment of compensation for war related claims, supra note 8, the U.S.
government should be required to follow its precedent in Grenada and elsewhere of paying
combat related claims. Interview with John Kiyonaga, Attorney for plaintiffs (Aug. 21, 1990).
Moreover, lawyers representing these Panamanian civilians claim that the economic assistance
package will not necessarily help individuals who have been harmed. Instead, they argue, it is
designed primarily to alleviate Panama's foreign debt, fund government construction programs
and provide low-interest loans and trade benefits to Panama's businesses. It includes no
compensation for innocent victims of the invasion. Kiyonaga & Kiyonaga, Compensate
Innocents in Harm's Way, L.A. Times, Apr. 1, 1990, at M7, col. 1.
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